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RECENT CASES
EXCESS LIABILITY OF AN INSURER FOR BAD FAITH
REFUSAL TO SETTLE-MAY INSURED ASSIGN
CLAIM TO INJURED PARTY?
Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 207 Pa. Super. 1,
214 A.2d 634 (1965)
Robert Gray was injured in an automobile accident caused
by insured's negligence. Pending litigation, Gray made an offer,
refused by Nationwide, to settle the claim within the 5,000 dollar
policy limit. In the subsequent negligence action Gray recovered a
15,000 dollar judgment against the insured.' Nationwide paid the
full extent of the policy coverage. Gray then sought payment of
the balance from the insured who, in full satisfaction of the outstanding judgment, assigned to Gray his alleged claim against
Nationwide for bad faith refusal to settle within the policy limits.
The trial court dismissed Gray's complaint based on the purported
assignment. Equally divided, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 2 affirmed, holding that an insured's cause of action against an insurer for bad faith refusal to
settle within the policy limits sounds in tort and is not assignable
before verdict.8
Very few cases have dealt with the question whether the
injured-claimant may recover in an action against the insurer for
failure to settle within the policy limits. 4 It is generally held that
1. Gray v. MacLatchie, 403 Pa. 595, 170 A.2d 590 (1961).
2. 207 Pa. Super. 1, 214 A.2d 634 (1965).
3. Id. at 2, 214 A.2d at 637. The superior court also held, by implication, that payment of the excess verdict by the insured was not a prerequisite to his claim against the insurer. Both the trend and the better
reasoning support such a result. See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., 340 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1965); National Farmer U. P. & C. Co.
v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964); Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1961); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Dalrymple, 270 Ala. 119, 116 So.2d 924 (1959); Brown v. Guarantee
Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957); Southern Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952). Contra, Harris
v. Standard Acc. & Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2nd Cir. 1961); Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 140, 26 A.2d 361 (1947).
4. See American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 179 F.2d
7 (10th Cir. 1949); Kleinschmitt v. Farmer's Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 101 F.2d
987 (8th Cir. 1939); Lemons v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 92
(E.D. Ky. 1959); Chittick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp.
276 (D. Del. 1958); Wessing v. American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775
(W.D. Mo. 1955); Comunale v. Trader's & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 328

Spring 1966]

RECENT CASES

the injured-claimant has no cause of action directly against the
insurer. 5 Attempts by the injured-claimant to recover indirectly
through the insured's cause of action by garnishment of the insurer 6 or subrogation to the rights of the insured 7 have met with
little success. Two courts have passed on the assignment theory
urged in Gray, one court allowing,8 the other rejecting 9 the assignment. Recovery on this theory raises questions as to the nature of the insured's remedy and its assignability.
The duty to settle a claim within policy limits arises from the
insurer's reservation of the exclusive right to make a binding settlement. 10 Settlement within the policy limits is clearly in the
best interests of the insured, exonerating him of all personal
liability. The insurer, however, may want to litigate on the chance
that the claimant's recovery would be less than the settlement
offer. When the settlement offer approaches the maximum policy
coverage, the insurer loses little by going to court, but the insurer
will subject the insured to personal liability if the claimant obtains a verdict in excess of the policy coverage. Where bad faith
is shown," it is generally held that the insurer may be liable for a
refusal to settle to the extent that the verdict exceeds the policy
limits. 12
Gray follows the general rule that the insured's cause of action sounds in tort.' s The greater number of courts, however,
P.2d 198 (1958); Stilwell v. Parsons, 51 Del. 342, 145 A.2d 397 (1958); Canal
Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1959); Automobile Mut. Indem. Co.
v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 845, 184 So. 852 (1933); Francis v. Newton, 75 Ga. App.
341, 43 S.E.2d 282 (1947); Duncan v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 91 N.H.
349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941); Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592,
381 S.W.2d 914 (1964); Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah2d 256, 311 P.2d 376
(1957); Murray v. Mossman, 56 Wash.2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1955).

5. See, e.g., Wessing v. American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (W.D.
Mo. 1955); Murray v. Mossman, 56 Wash.2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1955). But
see Lemon v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Ky. 1959).

6. See Stilwell v. Parsons, 51 Del. 342, 145 A.2d 397 (1958); Murray
v. Mossman, 56 Wash.2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1955).

7. Chittick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 276 (D.
Del. 1958).

8. Comunale v. Trader's & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958). See also Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App.2d 775, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1964), reaffirming the decision in Comunale.
9. Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592, 381 S.W.2d 914
(1964).
10. See Record, p. 62, cray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Pa. Super.
1, 214 A.2d 634.
11. Some courts have required only negligent failure to settle. For
an excellent analysis and comparison of the good faith and negligence
tests see Keeton, Liability Insurance And Responsibility For Settlement,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1139-42 (1959). The test to be utilized in Pennsylvania appears unsettled. See Comment, 67 DICK. L. REv. 321 (1963).
12. For an exhaustive survey of cases and a discussion of the issues
which have arisen in this area see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
13. E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952);
Kleinschmitt v. Farmer's Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1939);
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have never been faced with the issues of assignability or the possibility of an action in contract. The language of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 14 indicates
that an action in contract would be proper:
[A]n insurer against public liability for personal injury
may may be liable for the entire amount of a judgment
secured by a third party against the insured, regardless
of any limitation in the policy, if the insurer's handling of
the claim, including a failure to accept a proffered settlement was done in such a manner as to evidence bad faith
on the part of the insurer in the discharge of its contractual
duty. 15
The court in Comunale v. Trader's & Gen. Ins. Co.1 6 faced with
the issues of assignability and the nature of the action, held that
the insured may elect between an action in tort or contract and
that the claim was assignable.
One consequence of finding a contractual duty is to negate
the policy provision regarding settlement which is expressly permissive. Such a construction, however, appears justified. The
modern liability insurance policy is a standardized contract, imposed and drafted by the insurer, whose .superior bargaining
strength leaves to the insured only the opportunity to adhere to
the contract or reject it."7 The agreement lacks "that freedom in
bargaining and equality of bargaining which are the theoretical
parents of the American law of contracts."' s Since the insured
has no choice but to contractually relinquish the power to settle,
he should be contractually assured that his financial interests will
be considered.
An action in contract, of course, would be assignable. Gray
placed the sole remedy in tort and held it was not assignable.
In precluding assignment of a claim for damage to the economic
interests of the insured the court relied upon Sensenig v. Pennsylvania R.R.,19 which involved a statutory cause of action for unfair
price discrimination by a carrier. The court held that the statute
provided a cause of action "to the party injured" and that the
Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592, 381 S.W.2d 914 (1964).
Contra, Comunale v. Trader's & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958) (tort or contract).
14. 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957).
15. Id. at 468, 134 A.2d at 227 (dictum) (emphasis added). See also
Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 188 A.2d 320 (1963)

(dictum), where the court appears to rest the insurer's duty on a contractual basis.
16.

50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).

17. The term "adhesion" contract has been used to describe this type
of mass standardized contract. See Comment, 5 SANTA CLARA LAW. 60
(1964)

which discusses the applicability of this doctrine to the field of

insurance.
18. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App.2d 690, 694, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 784 (1961).
19. 229 Pa. 168, 78 Atl. 91 (1910).
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claim was personal to the injured party and not assignable. The
reasoning in Sensenig, grounded completely on statutory construction, appears totally inapplicable to the facts in Gray and should
not be considered as barring the assignment urged in Gray. Furthermore, unless the insured's cause of action be classed as a
purely personal wrong such as slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or assault, there appears no decisive Pennsylvania authority to bar the assignment. 20 It can be argued that
the injury to the insured is not of a personal nature at all, but an
injury to his estate, property or financial interests 21 and within
the rule that a liquidated tort claim for damage to property interests is assignable. 22 The Pennsylvania courts have never considered the assignability of the insured's cause of action and any
attempt to bring it within the existing framework of case law appears both artificial and unsound. The real issue is whether this
specific cause of action should be assignable to the injured-claimant. Clearly if there is no sound policy against the assignment in
Gray, the claim should be assignable.
The Gray court cited possible fraud or collusion between the
insured and the injured party if the assignment be allowed.2 3 Fear
of fraud or collusion appears unwarranted. The test of the insurer's liability-bad faith-is not susceptible of being influenced by
any collusion on the part of the insured and the injured-claimant.
It is the merits of the original negligence action, at the time of the
refusal to settle,'2 4 which will determine whether refusal to settle
was in bad faith. In view of the practice of insurance companies
in taking statements from all parties concerned, the chances of
false testimony appears negligible. Moreover, any attempt by the
insured party to make the claim at the time of settlement appear in
favor of the injured party would probably run afoul of his testimony at the original negligence action. Thus, the effect of collusion or fraud on the test utilized in determining insured's bad faith
appears negligible, if not non-existent.
Even if the collusion of the insured and the injured party
could affect the merits of the claim against the insurer, the danger
appears more prevalent in a suit by the insured against the insurer
rather than under the facts in Gray. In a suit by the insured
against the insurer, both the insured and the injured party have a
financial interest in the outcome. The results of any collusion or
fraud will benefit both the insured and the injured party. Under
20.
21.

See 3 P.L.E., Assignments, § 9 (1957).
One court has described the injury to the insured stating that

"the [insurer's] act strikes the insured in his pocketbook and diminishes
his estate . . . it does not harm his person or his personality." Brown
V. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679, 695, 319 P.2d 69, 79 (1957).
22. See Coons v. McKees Rock Boro, 243 Pa. 340, 90 Atl. 141 (1914);
Maxon v. Chaplin, 9 Pa. D.&C.2d 649 (C.P. 1956).
23. 207 Pa. Super. at 2, 214 A.2d at 635.

24. Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957).
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the assignment theory urged in Gray, however, the insured loses
all financial interest in the outcome of the action against the insurer. The only person with anything to gain is the assignee.
The Gray court felt that if the assignment
were allowed, it
would give the injured-claimants in general an "unfair bargaining weapon" to influence settlement negotiations. 25 The threat of
later suit by the injured-claimant might force an insurer to accept
a settlement offer. This argument, however, is somewhat specious
since the injured-claimant already possesses this "unfair bargaining
weapon." Even without the right of assignment, the claimant
during negotiations can assert that the insurer may later be liable
to the insured for refusing to settle. The "unfair bargaining weapon," if it be such,2 6 was actually conferred when the insured was
given this cause of action.
- The decision in Gray may lead to injustice. When
the insured
is execution-proof, satisfaction of the injured-claimant's judgment
will depend on the arbitrary willingness and financial ability of
the insured to maintain an action against the insurer. If the insured were to bring an action against the insurer for refusal to
settle, any recovery would no doubt be attached by the injuredclaimant while still in the hands of the insurer. An executionproof insured may well prefer, and indeed may be forced by lack
of funds, to forego the expense and trouble of litigating a claim
which in essence is brought in and for the interests of the injuredclaimant. On the other hand, the insured may well be willing to
assign his cause of action to the real party in interest, the injuredclaimant, thereby satisfying the outstanding judgment with little
or no effort. Allowing the assignment assures just compensation
for those injured on the highways, 27 and avoids circuity of action.
In conclusion, it would appear that whether the insured's cause
of action be in tort or contract or both, no valid reason exists to
prevent the assignment urged in Gray. Moreover, an interesting
question arises whether the Gray rationale will be applied when a
party other than the injured-claimant is seeking to recover on the
insured's cause of action. When the insured has already paid the
excess verdict, his creditors should be permitted to maintain the
action. In such a case the creditor's chances of collection have
25. 207 Pa. Super. at 3, 214 A.2d at 636 (supporting opinion).
26. The question of an unfair bargaining weapon appears diminished
by the objective factors used in determining the insurer's liability. Also
the burden of proof on the claimant is so difficult that insurer's need have
no great fear. This is aptly demonstrated by the fact that even the jury
verdict over the policy limits is not indicative of insurer's bad faith since
the test is the merits of the claim at the time settlement was refused. See
Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957).
27. It has been held that the injured motorist is a third-party beneficiary to the extent of the policy coverage. For some reason the courts
have not extended this analogy to the claim involved in Gray. But cf.
Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So.2d 469, 472 (Fla. 1959) (concurring
opinion).
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been diminished by the assets paid to satisfy the judgment. The
same reasoning seems applicable as to whether the claim passes to
the trustee in bankruptcy. 8 The outstanding judgment, even if
not paid by the insured, may have been one of the factors entering
into the insured's bankruptcy. Finally the question arises whether
the cause of action passes to the insured's estate.29 To disallow
creditors or the insured's estate access to the cause of action is to
shift the loss occasioned by the insurer's bad faith onto the innocent
creditors or heirs.
RUDOLPH ZIEGER, JR.

. 28. See Palmer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1963);
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957) (the
cause of action passes to the trustee in bankruptcy). Contra, Harris v.
Standard Acc. & Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2nd Cir. 1961); Schueler v. Phoenix
Assurance Co., 223 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
29. Carne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 208 Tenn. 403, 346 S.W.2d 259 (1961)
(cause of action did not pass to insured's estate).

INSURANCE-ACCIDENTAL MEANS OR ACCIDENTAL
RESULTS AS A MEASURE OF INSURER'S LIABILITY
Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Pa. Super.
488, 214 A.2d 299 (1965)
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Beckham v. Travelers
Ins. Co.,1 has again approved the oft-litigated distinction between
the terms "accidental means" and "accidental result of intended
means," found in accident insurance policies and double indemnity
clauses. It is a well recognized principle that an injury is accidental if it is merely the unforseen and unexpected result of a voluntary act. According to one view, however, the injury is not effected by "accidental means" unless the act which produced the injury is involuntary and unexpected.2 This is the view followed in
Pennsylvania.3 Some jurisdictions deny that such a distinction
exists holding that
either term is descriptive of the layman's con4
cept of accident.
The plaintiff was the beneficiary under a group insurance policy taken out by the insured's employer. The policy insured against
death or bodily injury "effected directly and independently of all
other causes through accidental means . . . . -5 Decedent died of a
1. 206 Pa. Super. 488, 214 A.2d 299 (1965).
2. E.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934);
United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889); Ogilvie v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. 406, 209 Pac. 26 (1922); Rooney v. Mut. Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 74 Cal. App. 885, 170 P.2d 72 (1946); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 181 Md. 140, 28 A.2d 856 (1942); Mitchell
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 136 Ohio St. 551, 27 N.E.2d 243 (1940).
The
distinction is clearly expressed in Pledger v. Business Men's Ace. Ass'n of
Texas, 197 S.W. 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) wherein the court said that
"accidental death is an unintended and undesigned result; arising from acts
done; death by accidental means is where the result arises from acts unintentionally done." Id. at 890.
3. E.g., O'Neill v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 345 Pa. 232, 26 A.2d 898
(1942); Arnstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 329 Pa. 58, 196 At. 491
(1938); Urian v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 310 Pa. 342, 165 Atl. 388
(1933); Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 149 Atl. 96 (1930); Pollock
v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 102 Pa. 230 (1883); Zulinsky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 159 Pa. Super. 363, 48 A.2d 141 (1946); Camp v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 107 Pa. Super. 342, 163 Atl. 320 (1932); Trau v. Preferred Acc. Ins.
Co. of New York, 98 Pa. Super. 89 (1930); Semancik v. Continental Cas.
Co., 56 Pa. Super. 392 (1914).
4. Travelers Protective Ass'n v. Stephens, 185 Ark. 660, 49 S.W.2d 364
(1932); O'Neil v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 Idaho 722, 152 P.2d 707 (1944);
Bukata v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 Kan. 858, 67 P.2d 607 (1937);
Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N.W.2d 576 (1946); Provident
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 172 Okl. 591, 46 P.2d 372 (1935); Goethe v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451 (1937); Griswold v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., .107 Vt. 367, 180 Atl. 649 (1935); Newsoms v.
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 147 Va. 471, 137 S.E. 456 (1927).
5. 206 Pa. Super. at 489, 214 A.2d at 299. (Emphasis added.)
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self-administered overdose of: narcotics, *which was admitted by the
insurer to be an accident. 6 The trial court found the death to be by
accidental means and granted judgment for the plaintiff. In reversing,*the superior court held that the test was not whether the
result was accidental, but whether the means were. The court reasoned that. the means were the decedent's intentional acts and,
without some unintended slip or mischance
in the doing of these
7
acts, they could not be accidental means.
Presumably, if it could have been shown that the deceased's
arm slipped during the injection, causing the fatal overdose, or that
he misread the graduation on the syringe, his death would have
been by accidental means. The burden of proof, however, was on
the plaintiff, who was understandably unable to produce such evidence. It is evident from the Beckham case and from the considerable litigation on the subject that the distinction between accidental
results and means is rather technical and often confusing.
Much of the widespread confusion stems from a jury charge in
United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry.8 The insured jumped from
a platform and the shock of his landing caused internal hemorrage
and death. The trial judge instructed the jury:
[I] f a result is such as follows from ordinary means voluntarily employed in a not unusual or unexpected way, then, I
suppose, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental
means.
But if in the act which precedes the injury something
unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs, which produces
the injury; then the injury has resulted-through accidental means.9
.
The jury found that an involuntary twist of decedent's body was
the cause of death. On appeal the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to show accident, but the jury's finding was
upheld. It does not appear .that the validity of the attempted distinction between accidental means and result was ever in issue.
Nevertheless, the case -provided the impetus for- numer6us other
1 0 That trend reached its. peak
jurisdictions to adopt the distinction.°
when the United States Supreme Court followed the distinction in
Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co." The insured died of sunstroke while playing golf. His beneficiary was denied recovery on a
policy providing benefits for death or injury by accidental means,
6. "The defendant did not introduce any evidence and specifically
admitted that the death was accidental, that it was not homicide and that
it was not suicide." Id. at-490, 214 A.2d at 300.
• 1 7. Id. at 492, 214 A.2d at 301. See also Smith v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
24 Tenn. App. 570, 147 S.W.2d 1058 (1941).
8. 131 U.S. 100 (1889).

9. Id.at 109.
10.

Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 147, 106 N.E; 607 (1914);

Ashley v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co. of America, 241 Mich. 441, 217 N.W.
27 (1928). .

11. 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
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because the means-voluntary exposure to the sum-was not accidental. A vigorous dissent stated that the attempted distinction
would "plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog."'
This dissent has become the basis of the present trend toward abolition of the distinction. 3
This distinction appears to be alien to at least one basic concept
of insurance law: An insurance policy should be construed in the
manner
that it would be understood by the average man reading
it. 14 In Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co.1 5 the insured had died
from a self-administered overdose of veronal. The court refused to
make a distinction between accidental results and means, observing
that
insurance policies upon which the public rely for security in
death, sickness, or accident should be . . . free from fine
distinctions which few can understand until pointed out by
lawyers and judges ....
'[A] ccidental means' . . . is the
same as death occurring 'by means of an accident." 6
It would seem that this is the way the average person would
interpret the term "accidental means.' 7 Many laymen would probably refuse a policy containing such a clause if they were aware of
the interpretation given it by many courts. Such an interpretation
permits the insurer to avoid liability in many situations in which
the insured reasonably believes he is covered. This distinction
would seem to be a trap for those untrained in the subtleties of
the law.
The argument might be advanced that abolition of this distinction would force the insurer to assume liability for a host of injuries
against which it is unwilling to insure. A simple solution to this
problem is to place upon the insurer the burden of specifically
exempting such situations either by list or by general description
sufficient to apprise insured that limitations exist. Even: if the putative purchaser of such a policy does not understand the limita12. Id. at 499 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
13. E.g. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67
P.2d 80 (1937); Goethe v. New York life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451

(1937); Zinn v. Equitable Life. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 6 Wash. 2d 379, 107 P.2d
921 (1940).
14. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Erickson, 42 F.2d 997 (8th Cir.' 1935);
Fitzpatrick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. App. 2d 155, 56 P.2d 199
(1936); Tomavoli v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co, 75 N.J. Super. 192, 182
A.2d 582 (1962); Simoneau v. Prudential Ins. Co., 89 N.H. 402, 200 Atl. 385
(1938); Blue Anchor Overall Co. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins.
Co., 385 Pa. 394, 123 A.2d 413 (1956). "In an insurance policy the words
are to be judged in the light of the understanding of the average man who
procures such a policy." Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App.
Div. 324, 328, 10 N.Y.S.2d 106, 109 (1939).

15.

273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937).

16.

Id. at 143, 7 N.E.2d at 20.

17. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d
80 (1937); Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 295 N.Y. 294, 67
N.E.2d 248 (1946).
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tions, he is at least aware that his coverage is not complete and that
further explanation should be sought to ascertain the exact extent
of his coverage. In short, use of the term "accidental means" provides the insurer with a method of avoiding liability for accidental
results, while presenting the misleading impression to the layman
that the policy covers all accidents.
In Beckham, the court expressed disfavor with the law by
which it was bound:
Were this a case of first impression in Pennsylvania, we
might be inclined to follow the apparant trend of the recent
decisions in other jurisdictions but we are bound by the
decisions of our Supreme Court.18
The supreme court might be well advised to heed the misgivings
of the superior court and, when the opportunity presents itself,
abolish this artificial rule of construction.
ALAN R. Kxrm

18.

206 Pa. Super. at 497, 214 A.2d at 303.

PRACTICE-IMPOSITION OF COURT COSTS ON
ACQUITTED DEFENDANT RULED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,381 U.S. 923 (1966).
In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania' the Supreme Court of the United
States held a Pennsylvania statute 2 Which allowed a jury to
impose costs on a defendant found not guilty in a misdemeanor
action unconstitutional. Petitioner, Jay Giaccio, was indicted on
two counts of unlawfully and wantonly pointing and discharging
a firearm, a misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law.3 At trial a
verdict of not guilty was returned on one bill with costs on the
county. On the second bill the verdict was not guilty but costs
were placed on the defendant. Defendant then filed a motion requesting that he be relieved of costs contending that the statute
allowing the jury to impose costs was unconstitutional. 4 The
court of quarter sessions for Chester County granted petitioner's
motion and vacated the costs imposed.5 On appeal the superior
court reversed. 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
superior court. 7 The Supreme Court of the United States then
reversed declaring the statute unconstitutional.
8
The history of this statute may be traced from an 1805 statute
which provided for the levying of costs upon an innocent party.
An 1860 statute modified the Pennsylvania common law which
had placed the costs on the defendant in all instances.9
This statute at first glance appears to be rather anomalous
1.
2.

381 U.S. 923 (1966).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1222 (1963), provides in part:
In all cases of acquittals by the petit jury . . . the jury trying
the same shall determine, by their verdict, whether the county,
or the defendant shall pay the costs.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4716 (1963).
The firearm which Giaccio
fired was a starter's pistol which fired only blanks. The persons at whom
he fired were walking toward his yard and apparently frightened by the
firing of the pistol. In the superior court the majority said "He [Giaccio]
was fortunate to have been acquitted, but substantial justice was done to
all concerned by the imposition of the costs upon him." 202 Pa. Super. 294,
309, 196 A.2d 196, 197.

4. Giaccio argued that the statute was unconstitutional because (1)
it was too vague; (2) it allowed an improper delegation of legislative
power; (3) it violated due process; and (4) it discriminated against defendants in misdemeanor actions.
5. 30 Pa. D.&C.2d 463 (C.P. 1963).
6. 202 Pa. Super. 294, 196 A.2d 189 (1963).
7. 415 Pa. 139, 202 A.2d 55 (1964).
8. 4 SMrrH's LAWs 204 (1805).
9. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 4 S. & R. 126 (Pa. 1818); Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 30 Pa. D.&C. 466 (C.P. 1963).
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since it allows a jury to impose costs on a party found not guilty.
Should the defendant not pay these costs, he is jailed. Despite
this anomaly the statute has gone almost unchallenged during the
many years in which it has been in effect.' 0 One of the first cases
determining the constitutionality of the statute was Commonwealth
v. Tilghman." The court in construing the 1805 statute said that
the act would "prove beneficial" even though "at first view it
might appear unjust.' 2 One hundred years later in Commonwealth v. Cohen'3 the court, in holding the law constitutional,
echoed these sentiments when it said: "However anomalous the
course may appear to jurisdictions unfamiliar with our procedure,
it is the
law of the Commonwealth, and it works substantial jus4
tice.'
The decision on Commonwealth v. Franklin,6 decided ten years
before Giaccio, seemed to cast some doubt on the constitutionality
of the statute. The Franklin court held unconstitutional the practice of placing acquitted defendants on a bond to keep the peace.
The Giaccio majority in the superior court, however, noted differences in the two procedures.' 6 Nonetheless, the result is much
the same-an innocent party is punished. The constitutional basis
of the Franklin decision was that the statute was too vague. Because of this vagueness, the defendants lacked adequate notice
of the charge against them; there was a clear violation of due
process. In those cases which required a peace bond, the basis
of liability was that the person was "not of good fame." The
superior court said that this was not a sufficiently definite standard. 1'7 The standard used in imposing costs on acquitted defendants
was that they were "guilty of conduct reprehensible in some respects."' s This standard seems to be no more definite than the
10. Judge Woodside, in the majority opinion of the superior court,
made much of this in upholding the statute. At one point he said that
"we know of no Pennsylvania statute whose validity has been attacked
after so many years of constant application." 202 Pa. Super. at 297, 196

A.2d at 193.
11.

4 S.&R. 126 (Pa. 1818).

12.

Id. at 127. It should be noted that this case was heard before the

fourteenth amendment was adopted. Subsequent cases upholding the
statute would tend to show, however, that this made no difference in the
mind of the court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cohen, 102 Pa. Super. 397,
157 Atl. 32 (1931).
13. 102 Pa. Super. 397, 157 Atl. 32 (1931).

14. Id.at 398; 157 Atl. at 33.
15.
16.

172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952).
202 Pa. Super. at 299, 196 A.2d at 194. There are three distinc-

tions between the two procedures.

First, a person held on bond cannot

avoid jail by insolvency proceedings while a party required to pay costs
may. Secondly, there was no statute allowing for the bond in Pennsylvania
law. Thirdly, the bond was imposed by the judge, not the jury.

17. Id. at 298, 196 A.2d at 195.
18.

Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 4 S.&R. 127 (Pa. 1818).

King v. Commonwealth, 33 Pa. D.&C. 235 (C.P. 1963).

See also

Here the court
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one declared to be unconstitutionally vague in Franklin. In both
instances a defendant is punished, even though he has been acquitted of the charge brought against him. 19
Court based its decision on the "void
In Giaccio the Supreme
0
for vagueness" concept: 2
A statute which neither forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application
violates the first essential of due process
21
of law.
The Giaccio Court said that the Pennsylvania statute contained "no standards at all," thus violating the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process. 22 The Court also refused to accept
the state court's argument that case law interpreting the statute
cured the deficiencies by further defining the statute. The Court
said: "It would be difficult if not impossible for a person to prepare a defense against such general charges as 'misconduct, or
reprehensible conduct.' ",23 There are other Supreme Court cases,
however, which appear not to require this higher standard of definiteness. In United States v. Petrillo24 the Court in upholding a
pornography statute said that all that is required is language which
conveys sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct
25
It
when measured by common understanding and practice.
might then be seen that the standards which the Court sets for
drafters of legislation are in themselves quite vague. 26 Perhaps
the best reason for Giaccio and like decisions is found in Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion which states that "it is enough for
me that Pennsylvania allows a jury to punish a defendant after
finding him not guilty. That, I think, violates the most rudisaid: "The question might well be asked as to why the county should
pay costs when the conduct of defendant has been such as to bring the
case against him into a court." Id. at 237.
19.

See also Chester v. Elam, 408 Pa. 350, 184 A.2d 257 (1962)

(ordi-

nance prohibiting "disorderly conduct" held to be unconstitutional because
of vagueness).
20.
21.

381 U.S. 923 (1966).
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).

22. 381 U.S. at 926.
23. Ibid.
24. 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
25. Id. at 7-8. In Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), the

Court said:
The law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his
estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it,
some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may
he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur
the penalty of death.
Id. at 377.
26. For an extensive discussion of the void for vagueness concept see
Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. Rv. 67 (1960).
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mentary concept of due process of law." 27
As Justice Stewart indicates, the statute seems to be blatantly
unconstitutional since it allows an innocent party to be charged
with costs and possibly imprisoned should he not pay. The statute
imports into the criminal law a vague third area lying somewhere
between guilt and innocence. It can be said in favor of the statute
that the jury imposing costs must have felt that the defendant
was guilty of some misconduct which merited punishment. The
imposition of costs allowed the jury to compromise by acquitting
the defendant while still punishing him in a lesser way. Without
the compromise there will probably be more guilty verdicts and
more imprisonments. The question then becomes one of balancing
the value of the statute against the possible abuse. The Court
decision seen in this light would appear correct. If there is to be
a compromise between guilt and innocence, this compromise should
be achieved in a different manner and based on more definite
standards.
GARY

27.

381 U.S. at 927.

C. HORNER
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